- We all want peace, everybody.

Ukraine wants peace.

We want peace.

NATO wants peace.

US wants peace.

Everybody wants peace, except Putin.

(slow tempo music) (slow tempo music continues) - Hello and welcome to GZERO World.

I'm Ian Bremmer, and today I am bringing you two very different perspectives on Moscow's expansionist aims in Europe.

First, I'll be joined here in New York by Latvia's foreign minister Baiba Braze to talk about the state of Baltic security at this precarious geopolitical moment.

She's closely watching her small nation's vulnerable 176-mile border with Russia.

Then we look to Moscow and my conversation with former Russian colonel and former Carnegie Moscow Center director, Dmitri Trenin.

In the early 2000s, Trenin was known for his pro-Western stance, but his Putin consolidated power, Trenin's views have fallen into alignment with the Kremlin's.

I don't endorse his opinions, or anybody's for that matter, but I do think it's important to hear candid views from the Russian perspective, especially at a time when the Trump administration is more open than ever to that perspective, much to the chagrin of European allies.

All that and more.

But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

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- [Narrator] Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint (bright music) and scale their supply chains.

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- [Announcer] And buy.

Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

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Additional funding provided by Jerre and Mary Joy Stead, Carnegie Corporation of New York.

And.

(bright music) (tense music) - On Christmas day of 2024, satellite imagery showed a rickety oil tanker the size of two football fields slowing down in the Baltic Sea's Gulf of Finland.

What the satellites couldn't see was the ship's 11-ton anchor gouging a 60-mile scar along the seabed floor, severing the Estonia to Finland Estlink 2 subsea power cable in the process.

That's the accusation from Finnish authorities who quickly boarded the ship.

They assumed command and they confiscated 100,000 barrels of illicit oil from St. Petersburg.

That ship, the Eagle S, flies the flag of the Cook Islands, but European officials claim it's actually part of Russia's quote, "shadow fleet" of aging vessels used to evade European sanctions.

And this shadow fleet today accounts for up to 17% of all oil tankers worldwide.

Some of those same ships, EU officials say, are engaged in sabotage of the undersea communication and data cables that connect Europe to the modern world.

These deep water disruptions are just one example of how close the Baltic nations, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, are to the Russian War.

Cyber warfare is another.

A 2007 cyber attack in Estonia, widely attributed to Russia, was wake up call that spurred Baltic nations to become trailblazers in digital security.

(guns popping) (cannon thunders) And following Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, such attacks have only intensified across the region.

Recently, Google's intelligence experts have warned that Moscow has deployed one of its most elite hacking groups known as Sandworm to probe Baltic energy grids for weaknesses.

Sandworm is the same strike team that has repeatedly turned out the lights in Ukraine.

It's no surprise then that Baltic states spend more on defense as a proportion of their GDP than most other NATO member nations.

Latvia, for instance, went from spending just under 1% of its GDP on defense back in 2014 to being on track to reach at least 5% by next year.

That's a number that could melt even US President Donald Trump's heart.

And it's not just geography that makes Baltic leaders nervous about their Russian neighbor, it's history too.

In the 1940s, they were occupied by the Soviets, then the Nazis, then the Soviets again, up until the fall of the Soviet Union in '91.

Baltic officials fear they could be Putin's next target if his territorial ambitions extend beyond Ukraine.

That fear has only grown since President Trump has softened US-Russia relations behind Europe's back, all while berating Ukraine's president and parroting Russian talking points.

Here to talk about Baltic security in the Trump era is Latvia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baiba Braze.

Foreign Minister Braze, wonderful to have you on the show.

- Thank you so much for having me.

- Let's talk first about Ukraine for a few moments.

I assume you would welcome a peace negotiation on Ukraine that could end the war, but do you think we are on a path right now to a sustainable peace negotiation with Ukraine?

- The peace negotiation itself is not yet there in our understanding.

The elements are being put together.

We all want peace, everybody.

Ukraine wants peace.

We want peace.

NATO wants peace, US wants peace.

Everybody wants peace, except Putin.

Putin thinks he's winning the war even though within three years, nuclear-armed Russia has not been able to take more than fifth of Ukrainian territory.

So, he's not getting his objectives through war.

And so we have to be very careful that within that peace negotiation, Putin is not able to get his objectives.

And one of his objectives is to weaken US power, to weaken US friendships with its allies, to weaken US power, whether in Indo-Pacific or in Europe or elsewhere.

So we have to be very aware that there's a lot of stuff that Russians are trying to achieve that is not directly related to the peace in Ukraine.

- Is it plausible to talk about a NATO path for Ukraine, when the United States is saying that they won't support it?

Is it possible?

- I think it's important to remember that when the first invasion in 2014 by Russia into Ukraine took place, Ukraine was officially neutral country in its constitution.

It didn't have NATO objective, there was no NATO discussion, there was nothing happening.

Russia invaded.

So, it was not about NATO.

You know, all that propaganda about NATO being the reason why Russia attacked Ukraine is complete nonsense.

- You said that the Russians believe they're winning the war.

Why do you think that is?

Because I mean, we've talked about, I mean 100,000 dead Russian soldiers.

- Oh, it'll be a million this year.

- I mean dead- - Dead and wounded in action.

- And you're talking about casualties, also wounded in.

It's 700,000 now, including casualties.

- 865,000.

- It's an astonishing number.

It's a staggering number.

- I agree.

- The Russians clearly are prepared to continue to fight, but why do you think that Putin believes he's winning the war?

- The war machine is ongoing and it's very difficult to stop it.

It also has allowed him to consolidate his power, all the instruments of power within Russia oriented towards war Politics, economy, religion, media, private sector, all have consolidated around the war.

But we clearly know there are indicators which shows that there are problems.

The society, the talks, the conversations happening on social media, on classified channels in Telegram, elsewhere, society in Russia, even though it's not about standing up or protesting or anything, is clearly understanding it's a war, and that is costing them quite a bit.

And you mentioned the casualties, the wounded in action.

If the projection happens with more than a thousand today killed or severely wounded, it's gonna be a million Russians this year.

- But it's not gonna change the view.

- So, that is then the other part is how long can this work?

And war economy, as we know, is not a productive economy.

It's not like you sell those old tanks.

You take them out somewhere from the storage, polish them up, send them to the front where they're eliminated.

You produce ammunition, again, that's all eliminated.

So it's not a productive economy in Russia.

And that's why you see the high level of inflation more than 10%.

That's why you see the interest rates about 20%.

That's why you see ruble's value losing its value, almost half of its value.

So, the economy is a house of cards.

It's on a shaky ground.

So if the ground becomes shakier, there will be consequences for that.

People say visually, you don't see that in Moscow and Petersburg.

Maybe.

That's not the point.

The point is what is systemic indicators?

So, actually cutting down on those energy experts from Russia will bring peace much sooner.

And if there would be one advice to the US administration I would give is really go after the Russian.

- Be tougher.

- Income from energy exports.

- And yet a we see happening right now, starting with the 90-minute phone call between Trump and Putin, persisting, expanding with the Riyadh meeting between the Americans and the Russians, there has been a move towards rapprochement.

If we actually see a breakthrough between Putin and Trump, a bilateral breakthrough, how do you think the Europeans should respond to that?

- All the questions with starting with if is a speculation.

- That's true.

- So, we tend not to answer those and especially with regard to such serious issues as these.

But Europe is involved.

Europe, again, we talk all the time with Ukrainians.

We consult with Ukrainians, both, in terms of getting and gauging their knowledge, understanding of the situation, their interests and so on and so forth.

But also presenting our interests.

We talk with the US partners all the time, all the time.

Any outcome from peace negotiation, and we welcome that peace, it has to be both lasting, meaning that peace holds.

So, the elements have to be there to prevent a restart of hostilities, which would mean probably withdrawal of forces in a certain distance, which would probably mean moving back certain capabilities.

There will be other elements.

So, there has to be both the political side in place, take into account what Ukraine's views are on that.

But there also has to be, if there is a decision on having some security presence, military options that work.

So, I don't think we are there yet, but that's the thinking we have in Latvia.

We have covered and discussed that quite at length nationally - In the context of all of this, everyone's talking about the politics, and the statements, and Trump meets with Putin and "Oh my God, they're having a conversation."

But in the actual day-to-day operations of America's military engagement with Latvia, with the Baltics, that continues to be very robust today.

You have not experienced any change, have you?

- We have a long-lasting, perfect relationship with the US, starting from our peoples.

There are large communities of Latvians, Lithuanian, Estonians, Poles here in the US, very active politically, very active economically, very successful.

So there is that relationship among the people.

There is a political relationship.

We are some of the most pro-American societies that we have in Europe.

We don't have a problem with being pro-American.

You know, we are quite proud about it.

because the ideas of freedoms, liberty, sustained us throughout the Soviet occupation.

We always believed in freedom, we always were inspired by the US concept of freedom, and that actually matters for us.

So, the voice of Americas, the Radio Free Europe that were broadcasting into the Baltic states during the occupation actually provided a very strong inspiration for us.

- We've talked about Europe and Ukraine and the United States.

Russia is your adversary.

I've seen a lot of the asymmetric attacks against the Baltic states..

I've seen the attacks on the fiber cables going from the Baltics to the Nordics.

Are you fighting, essentially, a war against Russia?

Is Russia conducting a war against your country right now?

- The Russian concept of warfare includes sub-conventional warfare, which is being conducted.

It's not only about the Baltics or Europe, it's everywhere.

Those are what used to be called active measures in the Cold War times.

But it's, as I said, sub-conventional.

And that's part of the warfare, and that is what is happening.

So, we take it seriously.

The new element a few years ago was illegal migrants pushed across our border.

And we actually built a wall.

We did build a wall.

Both in terms of military capabilities, having the proper sort of strength to delay any movement if necessary, but also for border security.

So, with all the monitoring capabilities with technology to make sure that that is addressed.

We have invested a lot in our internal security services to enable that capability to monitor and understand the activity.

Because once you understand that, again, sub-threshold activity, it's much easier to be ready and respond.

- So how concerned are you about the potential of an actual conventional Russian invasion into the Baltic states?

- Listen, we are members of NATO.

It would be a totally different type of war if the butcher in Kremlin would try to restart something like that, begin a war against NATO.

Having said that, in the same time, what we do, what is our responsibility to have, as NATO, those deterrence capabilities both in place, to have the will to demonstrate that ability, to be strong.

And that's what we are doing.

So for now, we don't see that scenario happening.

The task for all of us is not to exclude anything.

So, to be ready, to be prepared, to exercise, to test, and to make sure it doesn't happen.

And to be serious about this sub-conventional warfare threshold to make sure that we deal with various threats, including in the information space, properly.

So, that would be my short long answer on this question.

But lots of mistakes are made by the failure of imagination, and that's why it's so important not to exclude any scenarios, and to be ready for whatever happens.

- Foreign Minister Braze, thanks for being on the show.

- Thank you so much for having me.

(slow tempo music) - So that was the view from the Baltics.

Now let's hit a few hundred miles eastward to Moscow, where I'm joined remotely by former director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Dmitri Trenin.

Dmitri Trenin, great to see you again.

- Great to see you, Ian.

- Talk a little bit to me about how different you see the Trump administration and its orientation towards Russia.

Trump has taken on directly a number of talking points on Russia and Ukraine that would've been almost unimaginable for most Americans even a few months ago.

I mean, saying basically that the Ukrainians are responsible for starting the war, that Zelensky himself is a dictator, that elections are required.

I mean, do you think that this kind of whiplash in policy from the United States is sustainable?

- Well, I wonder.

I think that these developments have surprised not only most people in the United States, but also a lot of people here.

And I think it's still too early to basically pass judgment on how sustainable this new foreign policy course is.

And I'm keeping an open mind.

It's remarkable what President Trump has done by challenging some of the dogmas of US foreign policy in the past.

And it's so courageous, but there have not so many presidents who dare to attack the darkness that people have been living on there for a long time.

- So, what do we think about the Ukraine ceasefire process?

Do you think that the Russians can do a deal over the head of the Ukrainians that's sustainable just with the United States?

Is that the best possible format for Russia, just let Putin and Trump work it out and you don't need the Europeans and the Ukrainians to be a part of it?

- Ian, I will challenge you on this ceasefire thing.

Russia is not interested in the ceasefire.

I can see why Ukraine may be interested, I can see why Europe may be interested, I can see why Mr. Trump is interested in a ceasefire.

But Russia is interested in the lasting piece.

Russia is interested in its key national security objectives being met as a result of the Ukraine settlement.

We're very far from that.

So, if the plan is only to have a ceasefire and then talk later, I don't think it will work.

- So, when we talk about Ukraine-related issues specifically, should those negotiations include the Ukrainians, or should they just be the US and Russia?

- Well, I think the US and Russia, again, we're talking about the real power distribution in the world, or at least in this part of the world.

There are two countries that have agency in the Ukraine conflict.

One is the United States and the other one is Russian.

Ukraine is fighting on the ground and it's offering stubborn resistance to the Russian forces, so you cannot say Ukraine doesn't exist, it does.

But on the political side, Ukrainians do not matter much because they are heavily dependent on the United States, and to a lesser extent, far lesser extent, on Europe.

Ukraine would not be able to hit any targets inside Russia without US intel support.

Ukraine will not be able to fire, except just a few rounds, had the United States stopped its arms deliveries to Ukraine.

So, Ukraine is a country heavily dependent.

Talk about Ukraine sovereignty, and it does not exist.

- So, a long-term sustainable peace needs to be determined by the Americans and Russians largely themselves.

The Europeans shouldn't be a part of that because they just don't have any power, from your perspective.

- The framework should be, I think, should be decided by the United States, the broad framework, and Russia.

Now, of course, there will have to be negotiations with Ukraine.

Ukraine will have to agree to certain things, and it takes a Ukrainian head of state, a legal legitimate head of state, to sign all those documents at the end of the day.

The Europeans are certainly involved in any or should be involved in any discussion pertaining to security in that part of Eurasia, if you like.

I think it was Lavrov who said it, that of course Europe and Ukraine will be part of the negotiation process at a certain juncture when it comes to the matters in their competence.

But, again, there are two powerful countries that have agency and it is essentially a proxy war, proxy conflict between America and Russia.

And it can be resolved, again, in broad strokes by the Russians and the Americans.

- Do you think, Dmitri, that the principle of territorial integrity deserves to be dustbinned, and that what we're really talking about is that powerful countries need to make the rules and everybody else has to just kinda deal with it?

- No, I don't think that the powerful countries will have a right to redraw the map of the world as they wish.

I don't think that's a good recipe for the future of the world order.

On the other hand, borders between countries of the world have been changing all the time.

And to pretend that somehow now the borders that exist now are here forever, or cannot be changed except by some sort of an internationally approved referendum or something like that, this is all fantasy.

Borders are being changed.

They will continue to change.

And I'll tell you one thing.

Had there been no NATO thing with regard to Ukraine, had there been no attempt for Ukraine to be drawn into the NATO alliance or Ukrainian leadership's attempt to be invited into NATO, had there been no Russophobia in Ukraine, Crimea would be Ukrainian today.

The borders of Ukraine of 1991 would still be standing, you know?

No major power would tolerate another major power having a proxy to threaten it at close distance.

- So, you know that I also have the Latvian foreign minister.

Will you at least tell the Latvian foreign minister that Russia absolutely is not going to invade the Baltics after they take a chunk of Ukraine?

- Well, I think it's a big lie to say that Ukraine is a stepping stone to Russia reestablishing control over the territories of the former Soviet Union, former Russian Empire, or the former Warsaw Pact.

It's a big lie that's been used for ulterior purposes by some ruling circles in the West, in my view.

And it works as a powerful facilitator of European integration, 'cause that's the barbarians at the door, that kind of thing.

It resonates with a lot of people in Europe, but it doesn't make it less of a lie.

Now, I don't think that there was ever a plan or even an idea seriously taken by the Russian leadership of invading or intervening in the Baltic republics.

- Dmitri Trenin, great to see you again.

- Thank you, Ian.

(slow tempo music) - That's our show this week.

Come back next week if you like what you see or even if you don't, but you have your own expansionist ambitions on Europe, why don't you check us out at gzeromedia.com?

(upbeat music) (upbeat music continues) (upbeat music continues) (upbeat music continues) (gentle music) - [Announcer] Funding for GZERO World is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

- [Narrator] Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint (bright music) and scale their supply chains.

(bright music) With a portfolio of logistics and real estate and an end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today, learn more at prologis.com - [Announcer] And by.

Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is working to create an impact in areas like sustainable agriculture, clean tech, healthcare, and more.

Cox, a family of businesses.

Additional funding provided by Jerre and Mary Joy Stead, Carnegie Corporation of New York.

And.

(bright music) (gentle music)